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Subject: CVS commit: pkgsrc/sysutils/cdrtools
From: Thomas Klausner
Date: 2013-04-24 11:40:38
Message id: 20130424094039.1672D175DD@cvs.netbsd.org
Log Message:
Update to 3.01a14:
All:
- Fixed a typo in include/schily/stat.h related to nanosecond
handling for NetBSD and OpenBSD
- New autoconf tests for sys/capability.h and cap_*() functions
from Linux -lcap
WARNING: If you do not see this:
checking for cap_get_proc in -lcap... yes
checking for cap_get_proc... yes
checking for cap_set_proc... yes
checking for cap_set_flag... yes
checking for cap_clear_flag... yes
your Linux installation is insecure in case you ever use the
command "setcap" to set up file capabilities for executable commands.
Note that cdrtools (as any other command) need to be capabylity aware
in order to avoid security leaks with enhanced privileges. In most
cases, privileges are only needed for a very limited set of operations.
If cdrtools (cdrecord, cdda2wav, readcd) are installed suid-root, the
functions to control privileges are in the basic set of supported
functions and thus there is no problem for any program to control it's
privileges - if they have been obtained via suid root, you are on a
secure system.
If you are however on an incomplete installation, that supports to
raise privileges via fcaps but that does not include developer support
for caps, the programs get the privileges without being able to know
about the additional privileges and thus keep them because they cannot
control them.
WARNING: If you are on a Linux system that includes support for
fcaps (this is seems to be true for all newer systems with
Linux >= 2.6.24) and there is no development support for capabilities
in the base system, you are on an inherently insecure system that allows
to compile and set up programs with enhanced privileges that cannot
control them.
In such a case, try to educate the security manager for the related
Linux distribution. Note that you may turn your private installation
into a secure installation by installing development support for libcap.
- The autofconf tests for broken Linux kernel headers now avoid to
warn for /usr/src/linux/include if this directory is missing.
- include/schily/priv.h now includes sys/capabilitiy.h if available.
Libscg:
- Trying to support suid-root-less installation of librscg users on Linux.
librscg now understands that a non-root program may be able to
create sockets for a privileged port.
Cdrecord:
- Trying to support suid-root-less installation of cdrecord on Linux.
NOTE: You need "file caps" support built into your Linux installation.
Call:
setcap \
cap_sys_resource,cap_dac_override,cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_nice,cap_net_bind_service,cap_ipc_lock,cap_sys_rawio+ep \
/opt/schily/bin/cdrecord
To set up the capabilities on Linux.
Cdda2wav (Maintained/enhanced by Jörg Schilling, originated by Heiko Eißfeldt \
heiko@hexco.de):
- Trying to support suid-root-less installation of cdda2wav on Linux.
NOTE: You need "file caps" support built into your Linux installation.
Call:
setcap \
cap_dac_override,cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_nice,cap_net_bind_service,cap_sys_rawio+ep \
/opt/schily/bin/cdda2wav
To set up the capabilities on Linux.
Readcd:
- Trying to support suid-root-less installation of readcd on Linux.
NOTE: You need "file caps" support built into your Linux installation.
Call:
setcap cap_dac_override,cap_sys_admin,cap_net_bind_service,cap_sys_rawio+ep \
/opt/schily/bin/readcd
To set up the capabilities on Linux.
Scgcheck:
- Link now against $(LIB_CAP) also as librscg needs it on Linux
Scgskeleton:
- Link now against $(LIB_CAP) also as librscg needs it on Linux
Btcflash:
- Link now against $(LIB_CAP) also as librscg needs it on Linux
Mkisofs (Maintained/enhanced by Jörg Schilling since 1997, originated by Eric \
Youngdale):
- -new-dir-mode now just superseeds the effect of -dir-mode on
directories that have been "invented" by mkisofs.
This is a more intuitive behavior.
- Link now against $(LIB_CAP) also as librscg needs it on Linux
Files: